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Abstract: This paper provides evidence on market making behaviour of FX 
dealer in the Tunisian FX. It uses a complete data set that includes intra-day 
trades for the euro and US dollar. The sample period is 1 January 2007 to 31 
December 2007. The results are consistent with the findings of the literature 
that used trades and inventories data. I find evidence that customer order 
flow has information effect on USD/TND. However, I do not find evidence 
that customer order flow has information effect on EUR/TND. Moreover, 
inter-dealer order flow has a positive effect on the market maker price 
strategy. I also find that the central bank intervention has positive and 
significant effect on dealer’s behaviour and price formation process. My 
study also suggests that dealer is risk aversion and his quotes flows the 
references quotes tendency.  
Keywords: exchange rate, order flow, microstructure, trading  
JEL codes: F31, F33, G15  
INTRODUCTION  
Foreign exchange market (FX) is a decentralized dealership market, where 
transactions pass to dealer for execution and dealer posts bid and ask in response to 
trading initiatives. In the FX market there is two markets an inter-dealer market in 
which dealers trade with each other and a customer market in which customer trade 
with dealers. Indeed, dealer quotes bid and ask prices in both markets and for each 
transaction. Accordingly, the FX market characterized by short tem price 
movements these movements can not be explained by macroeconomic 
fundamentals, Meese and Rogoff (1983). A number of studies on the Saida GTIFA 
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microstructure of foreign exchange markets have looked at this issue, Lyons (1995, 
1996, 1997), Yao (1998), and Bjønnes and Rime (2000). The issue is important 
because its implications of the analyses of market stability and relationship with 
risk at short term. But little research looked for how microstructure factors affect 
price strategy and dealer behaviour.  
Although, the order flow is a major source of private information, this 
private information is significant for price formation process and consequently for 
the dealer behaviour. Among all different types of order flow, dealer’s customer 
order flow is the most important one because it is the major source of private 
information, Lyons (1995) and Yao (1998). Hence, dealers with access to large 
customer transactions are expected to be better informed about exchange rate 
fluctuations Yao (1998), Cheung and Wong (2000) and Cheung and Chinn (2001).  
I empirically study three related questions concerning the importance of 
information factors, risk aversion, control inventory and central bank intervention: 
First, how type of order flow influence price strategies. Second, how control 
inventory affects price formation process. Third, how central bank intervention 
influences dealer behaviour?  
I use a new data set to study the price strategies and market making 
behaviour of one dealer in the Tunisian FX market. The data set covers two 
exchange rates EUR/TND and USD/TND over the period from 1 January 2007 to 
31 December 2007. Since I have all the information on each trade of my market 
maker, I can test dealer’s price strategies. In particular, I study dealer’s control 
inventory, order flow and central bank intervention impacts.  
The most important study of dealer’s behaviour and his price formation 
process is Lyons (1995), Yao (1998) and Bjønnes and Rime (2000). Lyons 
represents the first attempt to use trade and currency inventory data. However, 
Lyons has not used data for customer market. In contrast, Yao use a complete trade 
data and he finds that customer trades are the important source of private 
information and moreover he derives the majority of his trading profits from such 
customer trades. Empirically, I collect a new data set comprising the complete 
trades of a market maker and the central bank intervention to test the model’s 
theoretical findings. This complete data set allows me to examine dealer’s 
behaviour and price formation process.  MICROSTRUCTURE AND MARKET MAKER PRICE STRATEGIES: STUDY OF A TUNISIAN MARKET… 
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To rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 1 presents a theoretical 
model, section 2 provides features statistics, section 3 provides empirical evidence, 
and finally, section 4 concludes the paper.  
THE THEORETICAL MODEL  
In general, the prices deviate to their anticipated value, because of the effect 
of microstructure factors (undesired position, private information and transaction 
cost) Yao (1998). The Madhavan and Smidt (1991) model shows that the price is 
linearly related to the level of stock inventory:  
  ( ) t i it it it D I I P Ψ + − − =
* γ µ  (1) 
Where   µit is the dealer i’s expectation of the fundamental value  t m ~  of the 
currency at time t,  
 I it is the inventory currency of the dealer i,  
 I i
* is the desired inventory level, and  
   is the parameter measuring the inventory effect.  
 D t is an indicator variable which takes value +1 for dealer j’s purchase 
and -1 for he’s sale.  
 The constant   represents the transaction cost (the presence of 
transaction cost implies a positive spread), ψDt measures the spread. Then, the 
dealer J always buys at dealer i’s ask and sells at dealer i’s bid.  
During each period, the dealer chooses the optimal trading volume Qt, to 
take account to his liquidity and his private information. The dealer uses the Bayes 
rule to extract the information conducted by Qtand to form his expected future 
trade. The process of price formation can be written as:  
  t t t t t t t D D I I Q P ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = ∆ − − 1 5 4 1 3 2 1 0    (2) 
Where   t ε  represents public information,  
  Qt represents the Net order flow addressed by the dealer J to the market 
maker i,  
  I is the inventory currency,  
  Dt is the indicator variable previously defined, which takes value +1 for 
the buy order and value -1 for a sale order.  
Madhavan and Smidt (1991) show the importance of information effect 
explained by β1. However, they show that the effect of the inventory is equal to 
zero β2 =β3 = 0 . This model was used by Lyons (1995), he divided Qt into direct 
transactions and others carried out by brokers, and he used asymmetry information 
model and the inventory control model.  Saida GTIFA 
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However, using the data of Lyons, Romeu (2001) announces that the two 
effects appear after structural cuts for the sample period. Bjønnes and Rime (2001) 
divided Qt into interbank transactions and customer transactions. They found that 
customer transactions affect the dealer profit, but they haven’t any effect on the 
currency inventory.  
 
The database  
The data set used in this study consists of complete spot trades of EUR/TND 
and USD/TND of one important dealer in Tunisian foreign exchange market during 
252 days (until January 2nd, 2007 to December 31st, 2007). My dealer’s bank is 
one of the most active market maker in Tunisian FX market, with a substantial 
customer order flow. His average daily volume is approximately 5770460.43 euro 
million and of 4708297.64 USD million, which is considered one of the four 
important market dealers. The data set is similar to that in Yao (1998). It includes 
the transaction prices, the trading quantities and dealer inventories over the sample 
period.  
The most significant importance of my data set is that I use the inter-dealer 
transactions and customer transactions. In fact, Yao (1998) shows that the customer 
transactions are considered important because they represent the major source of 
the asymmetric information and because they generate part of the dealer profit. In 
this study, the customer transactions account for 45% of the trade volume. This 
explains the importance of inter-dealer transactions, which account for only 3% of 
the transaction number carried out by my dealer, but they account for 55% of the 
trade volume.  
GENERAL FEATURES OF VARIABLES 
Exchange rate  
The comparison of the market maker exchange rates and the references 
exchange rates communicate by the Central Bank of Tunisia (CBT) shows that 
quotes of my market maker follow official quotes. In fact, the market maker is risk 
aversion because the CBT does not announce his intention to buy or to sell 
currencies. The graphs summarize the weak difference between the dealer quotes 
(Pi), inter-dealer quotes (Pib) and reference quotes of the CBT (Pref ).  
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Graph 1 EUR/TND exchange rate 
 
 
Graph 2 USD/TND Exchange rate 
The graphs report that market maker quotes, as well as inter-dealer market 
average quotes follow the central bank reference quotes. The difference between 
market maker quotes and the CBT ones is about 0.071 and 0.33 on average, 
respectively for EUR/TND and USD/TND. Observing the graphs I note that the 
CBT follows a real depreciation policy of the TND (Tunisian Dinar) against the 
euro, and a real appreciation of the TND against the USD.  
Of course, these results would deserve to be thorough by including the effect 
of the microstructure variables on the market maker intra-day activity in particular 
on the exchange rates evolution and currency inventory, as well as the currency 
inventory exchange rates fluctuations influence the market maker behaviour. In 
fact, before testing these variables I test the exchange rate stationarity. Then, for 
each data set of foreign exchange rates, I distinguish two different prices practice 
by the market maker: The price Pi to which inter-dealer transactions are carried out 
and the price Pj applied for customer trades.  Saida GTIFA 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests suggest that the two foreign exchange rate 
series present a unit root in level, and are stationary in first differences. These 
results are conforming to the literature, such as the results of Lyons (1995) and 
Galati (2000). The only ambiguous result could relate to the rate EUR/TND, to 
which the customer transactions are carried out, it is stationary in level.  
Table 14 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
  EUR/TND   USD/TND  
  Pi Pj Pi Pj 
Level   -1,177813   -3.714827***   -0,373289   -0.147591  
First difference   -8, 749343***  -11.87343***   -8,144946***  -8.644894***  
Acceptance of H0 (stationary): *** to 1%, ** to 5%, * to 10%.  
Table 14 summarizes the behaviour of the market maker spot exchange 
rates. Foreign exchange rate USD/TND made the average of 1.2781 TND to US 
dollar for the inter-dealer transactions, and of 1.2769 for the customer transactions, 
and it reached a high level of 1.3164 and 1.3155 respectively for the two types of 
transactions, then the general tendency is the appreciation of the TND against US 
dollar during the sample period. Whereas, EUR/TND made the average of 1.7456 
and 1.742 respectively for the two types of transactions, and reached its high level 
1.7972 and 1.7941. Then I note percentage depreciation of 8% for TND against the 
euro over the sample period. The movements of USD/TND are generally 
characterized by short periods of relative stability. Moreover, on average the 
exchange rate of inter-dealer market is slightly higher than the exchange rates in 
customer market, however the bid-ask spread in customer market is higher than 
bid-ask spread in inter-dealer market.  
Table 15 Summary statistics of exchange rates 
    EUR/TND       USD/TND    
 Pi    ∆Pi   Pj   ∆Pj   Pi   ∆Pi   Pj   ∆Pj  
Mean   1.7456   0.0002  1.7422  0.0002   1.2781  -0.0003  1.2769   -0.0003 
Median    1.7470   0.0003  1.7429 -8.9E-05 1.2894 -0.0004 1.2883    -0.0003 
Max   1.7972   0.0649  1.7941  0.4462   1.3164  0.0246  1.3155   0.0297 
Min   1.6683   -0.0712  1.6896  -0.4440  1.2081  -0.0167  1.2098   -0.0257 
Std dev   0.0267   0.0086  0.0261  0.0534   0.0296  0.0046  0.0295   0.0052 
Skeweness   -0.1652   -0.7717  -0,0633  0.0339   -0.8004  0.3197  -0.8166   0.4541 
Kurtosis   2.4381   35.8602  2.2427  61.004   2.3790  6.3339  2.4171   11.677 
Jarque-Bera   4.4269   11227.5  6.1154  34906.7  30.710  119.56  31.202   789.78 
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Order flow  
In this study, order flow is measured by the difference between purchases 
and sales orders. 
The purchases orders are affected by a sign (+) and the sales orders are 
affected by a sign (-). 
Given that the absence of information for hour of execution transactions, I 
calculate the sum of daily customer order flow and daily inter-dealer order flow. I 
use Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The null assumption that order flow has a unit 
root could be rejected. The series of order flow is stationary. 
Table 16 Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
  Di   Dj   Qi   Qj  
EUR/TND   -4.489617  -6.732645  -6.882884  -6.801821  
USD/TND   -4.576455  -7.560175  -5.908941  -6.684418  
 
The summary statistics for the order flow series are summarized in tables 4. 
The order flow average is different from zero for the two currencies. Whereas, the 
market maker specifies that the desired position I
* 
is null at the end of the day. 
However, I use the inter-dealers transactions and customer transactions. In 
addition, as it is advanced in Yao (1998), the series of order flow customers present 
a source of asymmetric information.  
Table 17 Summary statistics of order flow 
  EUR/TND   USD/TND  
  Qi   Qj   Qi   Qj  
Moyenne   2131381.  382515.0   1031032.  -1316227.  
Médiane   1000000.  484809.0   417164.9  -403493.2  
Maximum   1.21E+08  5748355.   32917000  3266448.  
Minimum   -8655170 -42040726 -8663000 -11669984   
Ecart-type   8362910.  3246537   3536640  2224256.  
Skeweness   12.61561  -9.770256  4.280023  -1.717308  
Kurtosis   179.2856  128.7209   36.31763  6.199511  
Jarque-Bera   302596.9  154456.5   10009.08  186.3663  
 
The series of order flow is stationary they can be decomposed into an 
expected component and unexpected component. I use the analysis of Box-Jenkins 
to find the best autoregressive model in order to avoid the problem of 
multicollinearity between orders flow and the currency inventories. Indeed, I use Saida GTIFA 
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the expected component, calculated from the residues of the autoregressive model. 
In fact, I use the criteria of Akaike information (AIC) and Schwarz (SC) to find the 
autoregressive model order:  
  t t t Q L Q ε ϕ α + + = ) (   (3)  
 
Where, εt is error term and L is the lag operator.  
Currency inventories  
The currency inventory is calculated at the end of each day. Indeed, I 
suppose that my market maker currency inventory is null at the beginning of the 
sample period. I take account of the effect of customer orders on the market maker 
strategies. Thus, the currency inventory is calculated as a currency inventory at 
moment t −1 increased (decreased) by the purchases (sales) currency with the other 
customer (banking and non banking customer).  
Table 18 Augmented Ducky-Fuller test of currency inventories 
 
The stationary of the stock inventory shows that it always turns over towards 
its average. This implies that the market maker adopts a daily control inventory 
strategy to avoid the inventory cost. I can check the strategy of control inventory 
by estimating the variation of the stock inventory at time t according to the stock 
inventory at time t −1 :  
  t t t I c I ε β + + = ∆ −1    (4) 
Table 19 Return towards the average inventory 
 
The estimation of stock inventory variation shows that my market maker 
stock inventory always turns over towards its average. The coefficient β for the two 
parities is negative and close to 3%. In other term, 3% of the deviation in stock 
inventory at time t −1 is eliminated in t .  
Table 20 reports the summary statistics of the currency inventory of my 
market maker. I find that the average of the daily inventory is different from zero. MICROSTRUCTURE AND MARKET MAKER PRICE STRATEGIES: STUDY OF A TUNISIAN MARKET… 
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One explanation is that the market maker carries out arbitrage operations to get rid 
of the undesired stock at the end of exchange day.  
Table 20 Summary statistics 
It   EUR/TND   USD/TND  
Mean   3.11E+08   -88278719  
Medan   3.33E+08   -92599043  
Max   5.79E+08   24984003  
Min   -3711657.   -1.95E+08  
Std dev   1.48E+08   60982140  
Skeweness   -0.395209   0.083256  
Kurtosis   2.429242   1.984303  
Jarque-Bera   9.861691   10.99092  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
My objective is to estimate price strategies of the market maker for two 
parities. Our methodology here is similar to that in Lyons (1995) and Yao (1998).  
Methodology  
I use the generalized method of moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982) to 
estimate the price strategies of my market maker. GMM has several important 
advantages that make it particularly suitable in this study. First, the GMM does not 
require an assumption of normality. In the estimate of the price strategies, the big 
number of the observations makes normality as not a good assumption. Second, 
Newey and West (1987) show that the variance-covariance matrix used in 
procedure GMM can be adjusted to treat the heteroskedasticity and the 
autocorrelation. Consider the estimation equation (2), where the error term 
represents the sum of the public signals between two successive transactions. 
Assuming that public signal occurs at all trade periods and the number of trades 
between two successive trade days is random. In conclusion, GMM was used in 
other empirical studies, such as Bessembinder (1994) and Madhavan and Smidt 
(1993). In addition, following Bessembinder the results in this study show that the 
instrumental variables set is identical to independent variables set. However, I 
correct the standard errors for the heteroskedasticity and the autocorrelation using 
the method of Newey and West (1987).  
Empirical results  
The objective is to estimate the price strategy model and inventory control of 
my market maker. First, I start with estimation of the basic model, and then I Saida GTIFA 
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decompose the order flow into several indicating variables, according to the 
transaction counterparts. Therefore, I integrate the variation of reference rate of 
central bank. I estimate the model of the equation (2). The results show a strong 
negative autocorrelation of the residues:  
 
∆P
it =β
0 +β
1Q
it +β
2 I
it +β
3 I
i,t−1 +β
4 D
t +β
5 D
t−1 +ε
t  
Table 21 reports the GMM estimation results of the price strategies. In fact, 
the model for the estimation is similar to those in Lyons (1995) and Yao (1998) on 
FX and others such as Glosten and Harris (1988) and Madhavan and Smidt (1991) 
on the stock markets.  
I have several noteworthy results. First, the coefficient of the order flow β1 
reflecting the informational effects is negative and insignificant. This show that my 
market maker does not increase its bid-ask spread following the adverse selection 
resulting from private information. On the other hand, the coefficients β2 and β3 
which are related to inventory control effects have the right signs for EUR/TND, 
but these signs are not validated for USD/TND. Overall, and according to Yao 
(1998), the dataset of USD/TND provides very weak evidence that quote is the best 
tools to control the stock inventory of the market maker. This is consistent with 
several works on FX, such as Yao (1998) and on the stock market, such as 
Madhavan and Smidt (1991). Madhavan and Smidt (1991) suggest that the 
statistically weak finding may result from the estimation of standard errors, due to 
multicollinearity between the transactions and the stock inventory. Moreover, the 
coefficients β4 and β5, reflecting the transaction costs, haven’t the right signs for 
EUR/TND. On the other hand, the sign of β5 for USD/TND is consistent with the 
result of Yao (1998).  
Table 21 Estimate price strategy by the model of Madhavan and Smidt 
Variables EUR  USD 
C   0.006867  
(0.875467)  
-0.000585  
(-0.135353)  
Qjt   -1.00E-10  
(-0.056217)  
-4.52E-10  
(-0.127915)  
It -2.97E-10   
(-0.183221)  
9.08E-10  
(0.345725)  
It-1  2.93E-10  
(0.180745)  
-9.08E-10  
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Variables EUR  USD 
(-0.353312)  
Dt  -4.63E-05   
(-0.708699)  
-4.30E-05  
(-0.295335)  
Dt−1   2.23E-05  
(1.021228)  
-8.12E-06  
(-0.366320)  
 
We carry out to estimate the model by dividing orders flow into several 
indicating variables, according to the transaction counterparts. Then, I decompose 
the orders into Qjc orders with customers, Qjb orders with other dealers and Qjbct 
orders with the central bank (which can advance signals on the future exchange 
policy and future monetary policy of the central bank). Indeed, the equation is the 
following:  
∆P
it =β
0 +β
1Q
jbct +β
1
'
Q
jb +β
1
''
Q
jc +β
2 I
it +β
3 I
i,t−1 +β
4 Dt +β
5 D
t−1 +εt  
Table 22 reports the results of estimate GMM of the price strategy according 
to the various participant orders. Then, the majority of the coefficients kept their 
signs for the two currencies. The coefficient of central bank order flow is positive 
for EUR/TND and negative for USD/TND. This means that the intervention of the 
central bank has a positive effect on the market maker price strategy. In addition, 
the central bank order flow is a source of information for the future evolution of the 
EUR/TND. Order flow of other dealers has a positive effect for the two currencies. 
This shows that my market maker quote follows inter-dealer market quote and the 
central bank reference quote. The coefficient of customer order flow is positive for 
the dollar and negative for euro. Indeed, the customer order flow is the source of 
private information, it provides the strong tool for generate profit from dollar 
trades.  
Table 22 Estimation the model of Madhavan and Smidt by  
dividing orders flow into several indicating variables 
Variables   EUR    USD 
C     -0.026116  
(-0.067187)  
 0.004761   
(0.123640)  
Qjbct     2.39E-08  
(1.982689)  
 -2.95E-09   
(-0.028183)  
Qjt     1.63E-09  
(0.095044)  
 2.32E-09   
(0.269777)  Saida GTIFA 
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Variables   EUR    USD 
Qjc   -1.96E-08   
(-0.078678)  
 5.94E-10   
(0.138311)  
It   2.61E-09   
(0.073550)  
 3.56E-09   
(0.218781)  
It−1     -2.50E-09  
(-0.073353)  
 -3.50E-09   
(-0.219291)  
Dt   -1.60E-05   
(-0.037118)  
 6.49E-05   
(0.207380)  
Dt-1  -3.43E-05   
(-0.064915)  
 1.20E-05   
(0.120882)  
 
Then, I try to analyze the central bank intervention effect on my market 
maker quote. The Central Bank of Tunisia intervenes indirectly, each morning, by 
transmission of reference quote for each currency to inter-dealer market. This rate 
indicates the intention of central bank intervention. Indeed, the CBT intervention is 
secret, since each morning the CBT transmits an ask reference rate and bid 
reference rate without announcing its purchase and sale intention. Overall, the 
reference rate indicates information about fundamentals variables (monetary policy 
and exchange policy).  
Indeed, the model can be written as follows:  
 
∆P
it =β
0 +β
1Q
i +β
2 I
it +β
3 I
i,t−1 +β
4 D
t +β
5 D
t−1 +β
6 ∆Pr ef 
t +ε
t  
 
The coefficient β1 is positive for the EUR/TND, which shows that order flow 
has an informational effect, particularly after my market maker receives the CBT 
reference rate. Then, the market maker selects the euro transactions following 
information that he deduces from the intervention rate. However, the coefficient β1 
is negative for USD/TND. The coefficients β2 and β3 that are related to control 
inventory have the right signs for the two parities. This means, following the 
reception of the CBT reference rate, my market maker acts on his stock inventory 
to adjust his quote. In this respect, I can conclude that the reference rate is a tool 
for inventory control of the market maker. The coefficient β6 is positive for the two 
currencies. This shows that market maker is a risk aversion and he follows the 
reference rate to determine his intra-day quote, in order to minimize the risk of 
excessive volatility.  MICROSTRUCTURE AND MARKET MAKER PRICE STRATEGIES: STUDY OF A TUNISIAN MARKET… 
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Table 23 Estimate the model by taking account of the CBT intervention 
Variables   EUR   USD  
C   0.134919  
(0.158068)  
-0.212405  
(-0.012329)  
Qjt  6.10E-09   
(0.116437)  
-7.44E-08  
(-0.012306)  
It  -2.26E-08   
(-0.156901)  
-3.17E-08  
(-0.012239)  
It-1   2.26E-08  
(0.156913)  
2.86E-08  
(0.012231)  
Dt -0.000619   
(-0.153699)  
-0.009492  
(-0.012290)  
Dt-1  3.54E-05  
(0.098621)  
-0.002364  
(-0.012247)  
∆Pr ef   52.44645  
(2.772310)  
233.1683  
(2.699132)  
CONCLUSION  
This paper has tried to provide contribution to microstructure approach by 
investigating the empirical relationship between quote strategy, customer order 
flow, inter-dealer order flow, currency inventory and central bank intervention. The 
model views the dealer as risk aversion agent who adjusts his quote by flowing 
reference quote and selects trades. Until now, most of the research in this area has 
related in inter-dealer market data set, since data on customer market were not 
easily available. This paper uses a new data set that includes intra-day data on 
trading volumes, currency inventory and intra-day quotes in two markets (customer 
market and inter-dealer market).  
An important result is that inventory control has a positive effect in price 
strategy of EUR/TND it provides strong evidence that quote is the best tool to 
control the euro stock inventory. But I find a little evidence of inventory effect on 
USD/TND rate. I also find that inter-dealer order flow has a significant effect in 
quoted prices of EUR/TND and USD/TND. This is consistent with the findings of 
the literature in Lyons (1995) and Yao (1998). They show that order flow effects 
quoted prices. The dealer in this study has substantial customer order flow and he 
practices a larger spread for such transactions. Indeed, these transactions are the 
major source of trading profit of the dealer in particular for dollar trades. Since 
customer transactions represent a source of asymmetric information because of low 
transparency of such trades. But dealers can deduce information from inter-dealer Saida GTIFA 
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trades in particular with development of electronic system such information can be 
free to dealers requesting quotes.  
Evidence from regression suggests that the central bank intervention has a 
positive effect in quoted prices of my dealer and the difference between quotes of 
the CBT and those of the dealer is very weak on average. This indicates that my 
market maker is risk aversion, he flows CBT reference rate and inter-dealer market 
rate to determine his intra-day quotes.  
Although the article throws some light on the impact of degree of risk 
aversion, information factors and currency inventory on a dealer’s quoting 
behaviour, it also highlights areas for further research. This study involves one 
individual dealer and two currency pair. Determining whether the results apply to 
other dealers and others currencies deserves further work.  
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